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The question of how multinational enterprises (MNEs) respond to local CSR expectations 
remains salient, also in the context of many African governments’ attempts to define and regulate 
business responsibilities. What determines whether MNEs respond to such local, state-driven 
expectations as congruent with their global commitment to CSR? Adopting an institutional logics 
perspective, we argue that a higher global CSR commitment will lead to higher local responsiveness 
when regulatory distance is low, but it will lead to lower local responsiveness when regulatory distance 
is high. We find support for our hypothesis using data on 93 MNEs’ responses to the South African 
state’s Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment policy. We thus contribute to the global-local CSR 
literature and show how MNEs’ local CSR responsiveness will not only be shaped by the local context, 









Multinational enterprises (MNEs) face significant institutional complexity (Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999), especially when managing corporate social responsibility (CSR) in different 
contexts. CSR requires companies to respond to universal, “global” principles of human rights 
and sustainable development (such as those highlighted by the United Nations Global Compact 
(United Nations, 2011)), as well as more particular, “local” societal and cultural expectations 
and state regulations (Husted & Allen, 2006; see also Campbell, 2007; Donaldson & Dunfee, 
1994; Matten & Moon, 2008). Motivated also by prominent cases of MNEs’ failure to respond 
to such local versions of CSR, this gives rise to researchers’ interest in what influences MNEs’ 
responsiveness to the local context of host countries (Husted & Allen, 2006).  
One might expect MNEs with a strong corporate commitment to CSR to have the 
motivation and capabilities to also respond proactively to local variants of CSR, and this is 
supported by some studies (Kolk et al., 2010; Cruz & Boehe, 2010). On the other hand, a strong 
CSR commitment may lead to global CSR approaches becoming institutionalised and  
“ingrained” throughout the firm’s structure, with little allowance for local responsiveness 
(Husted & Allen, 2006; Tan & Wang, 2011; Bondy and Starkey, 2014; Muller, 2006). This 
uncertainty in the literature is mirrored in anecdotal queries by African stakeholders about why 
some MNEs seem disinterested in or even adversarial towards local CSR-related expectations, 
despite prominent corporate CSR commitments. It is also reflected in MNE managers’ doubts 
about how their global CSR strategies are related to local variants, such as South Africa’s Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE1) policies (Chahoud et al., 2011).  
Indeed, the global-local CSR debate is particularly salient in the African context, due 
to these countries’ distinctive economic and institutional circumstances (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; 
Asiedu, 2001; Kolk & Van Tulder, 2010; Pratt, 1991). Particularly prominent in numerous 
African economies has been government policies and regulations focused on  “indigenisation” 
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or “black economic empowerment,” seeking to address colonial or apartheid legacies of 
Africans’ exclusion from the control or benefit of economic activity (Beveridge, 1974; Wilson, 
1990; Nwosu, Nwachukwu, Ogaji, & Probert, 2006; Ukiwo, 2008; Bellema, 2010). In the 
African historical and socio-economic context, such policies have important overlaps with the 
global CSR movement (Arya & Bassi, 2009; Hamann, Agbazue, Kapelus & Hein, 2005; 
Littlewood & Holt, this volume; Muthuri & Gilbert, 2011; Mzembe & Meaton, 2013), yet there 
are also idiosyncrasies associated with their thematic content and regulatory provenance. In 
this paper, we focus on how MNEs respond to these “home-grown,” state-driven African 
versions of CSR. More specifically, what determines whether MNEs respond to local, state-
driven African expectations as congruent with their global commitment to CSR?  
Building on the literature, we argue that the relationship between a MNE’s CSR 
commitment and its local responsiveness is moderated by the regulatory distance between host 
and home countries. We focus on regulatory distance because we expect this to play an 
important role given the regulatory provenance of the local African CSR variants in question. 
This builds on Matten’s and Moon’s (2008) arguments about the institutional embeddedness 
of CSR, including in particular the disparate roles of the state in different national business 
systems and corresponding differences in how CSR is manifested. We apply an institutional 
logics lens to theorise how global CSR commitment and regulatory distance interact to 
determine local responsiveness. We hypothesise that high global CSR commitment will lead 
to high local responsiveness when regulatory distance is low, but it will lead to lower local 
responsiveness when regulatory distance is high. This hypothesis is tested using data on 93 
MNEs operating in the strategic research setting provided by the South African state’s BEE 
policy (Arya & Bassi, 2009; see also Littlewood and Holt, this volume). Our research is 
exploratory given limitations in our methods and data, but we consider our findings and 
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arguments to be helpful in the context of sparse research on CSR and the role of state regulation 
in Africa. 
We contribute to the literature on global-local CSR and extend the analysis by Campbell 
and colleagues (2012) by focusing on regulatory distance and explaining its moderating 
influence on the role of MNEs’ CSR commitment. Applying an institutional logics perspective 
to the global-local CSR debate, we contend that the MNE-internal institutional environment 
“carries” the state logic so as to influence MNEs’ responsiveness to local, state-driven CSR 
variants. This allows us to extend Matten and Moon’s (2008) characterization of different 
institutionalized approaches to CSR to the context of MNEs straddling different institutional 
business systems, showing how MNEs’ local CSR responses are shaped not only by the 
complexities of the local context, but also their home country and firm-internal environments. 
We commence with a literature review on the global-local CSR debate and institutional 
logics to develop our hypothesis. In the methods section, we devote attention to our research 
setting to explain both the similarities and tensions between universal conceptions of CSR and 
BEE as a particular regulation-driven variant of CSR. We test our hypotheses empirically and 
then discuss contributions, limitations, and further research.  
 
Theory	
MNEs’ responsiveness to local CSR 
In addressing the question of what influences MNEs’ responsiveness to local CSR, 
some scholars have focused on firm-specific aspects, including in particular their global CSR 
commitment, while others have focused on firm-external aspects, especially the institutional 
differences between home and host countries. On neither of these dimensions, however, is there 
much agreement.  
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It has been suggested that MNEs with high global CSR commitment have both the 
motives and capabilities necessary for locally responsive CSR investments in host countries. 
In their study of retail companies’ CSR priorities in China, Kolk et al (2010) find that those 
companies with high global CSR commitment – Carrefour and Wal-Mart – implement some 
aspects of their global CSR strategy, but also show significant local responsiveness. Similar 
evidence of local responsiveness facilitated and motivated by a corporate commitment to CSR 
is found in the case of two French multinational retailers’ operations in Brazil (Cruz & Boehe, 
2010).  
On the other hand, a high level of global CSR commitment may lead to such global 
policies and practices being “ingrained,” and thus local responsiveness is diminished in order 
to maintain internal legitimacy and reduce internal co-ordination costs (Tan & Wang, 2011). 
Bondy and Starkey (2014) investigated the local CSR practices of 37 MNEs and found that 
they emphasise their global commitments and give surprisingly little attention to local cultures 
or circumstances. Similarly, Muller (2006) explored the CSR practices among Mexican 
subsidiaries of seven European MNEs in the automotive industry and showed that these firms 
tend to prioritise themes and practices associated with their global approach. Barkemeyer and 
Figge (2014) refer to the “headquartering effect” brought about by the increasing 
professionalization of CSR, which also prioritises internal coherence and legitimation of CSR 
at the expense of local responsiveness.  
With regard to firm-external factors, Yang and Rivers (2009) propose that MNEs’ 
subsidiaries will adapt to local practices to legitimize themselves if they operate in host 
countries with institutional environments different to the firms’ home countries. By imitating 
the strategy of local firms, MNE subsidiaries may acquire legitimacy and thereby reduce their 
liability of foreignness (Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006; Salomon & Wu, 2012). CSR is thus 
viewed as a strategic investment comparable to R&D and advertising (Gardberg & Fombrun, 
6 
 
2006), and this is especially pertinent when home and host countries are institutionally 
different.  
However, building on the literature on institutional, cultural and geographic “distance” 
as a significant challenge to MNEs (Kostova, 1996; Ghemawatt, 2001; Ionascu, Meyer & 
Estrin, 2004), Campbell et al (2012) argue that administrative distance – which includes 
regulations but also other aspects, such as political stability and government effectiveness – 
will make MNEs’ managers less empathetic to local constituencies and thus less motivated to 
adapt to local expectations, and it also makes local CSR responsiveness more difficult and 
costly. They confirm their hypothesis that increased administrative distance diminishes MNEs’ 
local CSR responsiveness with data on multinational banks’ responses to the U.S. 
government’s Community Reinvestment Act.  
Regulatory distance as a moderating variable 
We seek to respond to these conflicting arguments and findings in two steps. First, we 
suggest that a MNE’s global CSR commitment and the “distance” between host and home 
country institutions interact when influencing the MNE subsidiary’s local CSR responsiveness, 
and thus they need to be considered together. Specifically, we expect differences between host 
and home countries to influence the relationship between high CSR commitment and local 
responsiveness.  
Furthermore, while Campbell et al. (2012) identify a significant role for the broad 
construct of administrative distance, we focus on the more specific issue of regulatory distance. 
In doing so, we follow calls for disaggregated analyses of institutional differences (Jackson & 
Deeg, 2008; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Furthermore, we are motivated by our conceptual and 
empirical interest in African, state-driven variants of CSR, and specifically the anecdotal 
observation in South Africa that some MNEs with high explicit CSR commitment seem 
surprisingly unresponsive to state-driven CSR variants as part of their CSR strategies and 
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reporting. This has broader relevance in the context of the widespread adoption by many 
African governments of regulations focused on enhancing Africans’ ownership of and 
inclusion in economic activity, as well as increasing calls for state regulation to improve CSR 
uptake in Africa (Muthuri & Gilbert, 2011; Mzembe & Meaton, 2013).  
Our focus on regulatory distance is also motivated by an ongoing tension in scholarly 
and policy debates surrounding the degree to which the definition and implementation of CSR 
is discretionary or may involve state regulation. As noted by Matten and Moon (2008: 407), 
“In its very name, CSR presumes corporate choices… yet it also entails conformance with the 
law” (see also Vogel, 2010). The role of regulations in defining CSR in diverse institutional 
settings is thus an important issue in our understanding of CSR, and it is particularly salient in 
the African context. To our knowledge, there are no prior studies focusing on the role of 
regulations in CSR in Africa, so we aim to address this gap with this paper. 
As a result of the above arguments, we arrive at a model in which the effect of MNEs’ 
CSR commitment on local responsiveness is moderated by the regulatory distance between the 
MNE’s home and host countries. This is illustrated schematically in Figure 1.  
--------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
The role of the state logic 
In our second step, we seek to respond to the ambiguities in the global-local CSR 
literature by theoretically explicating the relationships in Figure 1 using an institutional logics 
perspective. In adopting this lens, we build on Kostova, Roth, and Dacin (2008), who point out 
the limitations of neoinstitutional theory and its emphasis on isomorphism in explaining 
MNEs’ responses to complex and dynamic institutional environments in diverse host countries, 
within the MNE itself, and in the MNE’s global, meta-institutional field. An institutional logics 
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perspective, on the other hand, lends itself well to an analysis of such heterogeneity 
(Greenwood, Diaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). We also 
follow Tan and Wang (2011) in applying this perspective to MNEs’ approaches to CSR, but 
do so in a different way. The institutional logics literature focuses on how macro-level, socially 
constructed assemblages of practices, beliefs, and values shape individual and organisational 
behaviour (Thornton et al., 2012; see also Alford & Friedland, 1985; Besharov & Smith, 2014; 
Friedland & Alford, 1991; Jackall, 1988; Joseph, Ocasio & Mcdonnell, 2014; Lounsbury, 2007; 
Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).  
Many of the early texts in the institutional logics literature emphasise the 
inconsistencies, contradictions and incompatibility of institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 
1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), with the result that analyses of organisations’ responses to 
numerous logics in situations of institutional complexity generally emphasise conflict and 
difficulty as outcomes (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). Yet, 
according to Besharov and Smith (2014) logic multiplicity can take diverse forms, as logics 
have varying degrees of compatibility with each other and also varying degrees of relevance to 
an organisation’s mission and identity. Furthermore, people do not always passively or 
uniformly react to institutional scripts; they can also bring agency to the process of responding 
(Thornton et al., 2012; McPherson and Sauder, 2013). For instance, Binder (2007) finds that 
numerous logics can be combined in a process of bricolage or what Besharov and Smith (2014) 
refer to as blending. 
Yet for logics to be combined or blended by organisational actors, they need to be 
available and salient. The implication is that MNE subsidiary managers will create their 
responses to CSR depending on the logics that are available and salient to them, as they 
emanate from the host country environment, the firm-internal environment, and the global 
meta-institutional field (Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). To identify which 
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logics are salient for our purposes, we relate logics highlighted by Thornton et al. (2012) to the 
variables in our model in Figure 1.  
Building on Besharov and Smith (2014), MNEs’ CSR commitment will be 
characterised by the blending of the market logic with what Thornton et al. (2012, p. 73) call 
the “community logic,” or what Besharov and Smith (2014, p. 376) refer to as “social welfare, 
development, or sustainability logics”. Committed CSR strategies emphasise cooperation and 
mutuality between the company and its stakeholders, they are informed by the community 
logic, which implies a belief in trust, reciprocity, cooperation, and transparency toward 
stakeholders. An implication is that, as a MNE’s CSR commitment increases, the pertinence 
of the community logic in the firm-internal institutional environment will increase for 
subsidiary managers. This logic’s emphasis on stakeholder engagement and mutuality would 
thus suggest that responsiveness to local approaches to CSR would also increase. This dynamic 
would explain findings by Kolk et al (2010) and Cruz and Boehe (2010), but it is contradicted 
by findings by Muller (2006) and Bondy and Starkey (2014). 
As noted above, we suggest such contradictions can be explained by the moderating 
role of regulatory distance and a corresponding, second logic. More specifically, given our 
interest in MNEs’ responses to local, state-driven variants of CSR, a key role is played by the 
state logic, which emphasises the state’s role and hierarchical capacity to enforce commonly 
binding rules for the public benefit (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 73). In host countries such as 
South Africa, local CSR variants involve an explicit, prominent role of the state in defining and 
motivating CSR, and so the state logic is pertinent. If regulatory distance is low, the MNE’s 
home country environment also provides for a significant role for the state logic in defining 
CSR. Building on Matten and Moon’s (2008) framework, this will be the case if the MNE’s 
home country is one of the coordinated market economies, such as many European countries, 
in which actors are more likely to expect and legitimise a role for government that is “more 
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engaged in social and economic activity” (op cit.: 407). Given that the MNE internal 
institutional environment is influenced materially by its home country – due to head office 
policies and subsidiaries’ reliance on firm-internal resources (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; 
Hillman & Wan, 2005; Tan & Wang, 2011) – this MNE internal environment will also “carry” 
the state logic as appropriate in defining and implementing CSR policies. As long as regulatory 
distance is low, there is thus an alignment between the MNE internal environment and the host 
country environment with regard to the role of the state logic in CSR. An increase in CSR 
commitment will thus elevate the pertinence of the community logic and an increase in local 
responsiveness, unperturbed by the state logic. 
On the other hand, if regulatory distance is high, the home country environment is 
characterised by a voluntaristic approach to CSR, which allows for only a very limited role for 
the state in defining and motivating CSR. This will be the case, building again on, for MNEs 
headquartered in liberal market economies, such as the United States, which are characterised 
by a logic that emphasises “corporate discretion” in the context of a “less active” government 
(Matten & Moon, 2008: 407). This gives rise to a potentially significant contradiction for the 
MNE subsidiary manager, because the host country environment expects a prominent role for 
the state logic in CSR, but the MNE internal environment – which, again, is shaped materially 
by the home country – prioritises a voluntaristic approach to CSR. The MNE internal 
environment will be particularly influential, given the role of hierarchical structures, 
headquarters’ efforts to create firm-internal coherence, and subsidiaries’ reliance on MNE 
resources (Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). This contradiction is particularly 
salient if there is a strong commitment to CSR, because this commitment is associated with a 
voluntaristic conception of CSR. Hence, if regulatory distance is high, increases in MNE’s 
CSR commitment will give rise to lower local responsiveness. 
Summarizing the arguments above, we hypothesize as follows: 
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Hypothesis: The regulatory distance between home and host countries moderates the effect of 
MNEs’ CSR commitment on local CSR responsiveness. Specifically, if the regulatory distance 
is low, MNEs with higher CSR commitment will have higher local responsiveness, but if 





South Africa’s industrialisation relied on cheap labour to, among other things, make the 
extraction of underground resources feasible. This was supported by a range of measures 
including the 1913 Natives Land Act and formal “apartheid” policies after 1948 (Sparks, 2011; 
Terreblanche, 2002). The result of these colonial and apartheid policies has been a deeply 
divided and unequal society, a legacy that has been very difficult to address by the democratic 
governments since 1994. South Africa has one of the world’s highest Gini coefficients (a 
measure of socio-economic inequality).2 Black South Africans continue to be largely excluded 
from control and ownership of the formal economy. Though the pertinent statistics depend on 
the definition of measures and the data used, it is estimated that direct black ownership of 
publicly traded South African countries has remained below ten percent, while about ten 
percent is owned indirectly by blacks through unit trusts and the like (Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, 2011). Blacks occupied just over 12 percent of top management positions in 2012 
compared to 10 percent in 2002 (Whites still dominate South African management, 2013). 
This duality and continued racial characteristics of the rich, formal economy and the 
poor, informal economy have been prominent features of the post-apartheid government’s 
rhetoric and policy-making. In 1998, South Africa’s then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, 
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described South Africa as “two nations”3 (Mbeki, 1998; Nattrass & Seekings, 2001). The most 
prominent government response has been its BEE policy framework, which found expression 
in a number of sector-specific, negotiated “transformation charters” (Hamann, Khagram & 
Rohan, 2008), as well as an overarching BEE Act (53 of 2003) and subsequent “codes of good 
practice” (Arya & Bassi, 2009). They provide for a so-called BEE scorecard that assesses 
companies’ performance in four areas: 1) Direct empowerment of black people through 
ownership and control of enterprises and assets; 2) Management by black people at senior level; 
3) Human resource development and employment equity, to ensure access by black people to 
job opportunities and career advancement; and 4) Indirect empowerment through preferential 
procurement (prioritising BEE companies), enterprise development (supporting small, black-
owned companies with training or access to finance), and “socio-economic development” 
focused on health, education, housing, or other social domains. Compliance has been sought 
primarily through two means. In some sectors, notably mining, companies’ access to necessary 
government licences depends on their ability to show progress in improving their BEE scores. 
The second mechanism is through the government’s procurement system, which gives 
preference to BEE compliant companies. These two pressures are particularly pertinent to 
relatively large firms, but through the preferential procurement element in the BEE scorecard 
they are implemented indirectly along supply chains throughout the economy. 
Importantly, rather than being a national idiosyncrasy, South Africa’s BEE policy and 
the debates that have been surrounding it (e.g. Shubane & Reddy, 2005, 2007; Ponte, Roberts 
& van Sittert, 2007; Alessandri, Black & Jackson, 2011) can be seen as an expression of 
prominent debates, tensions, and state strategies in numerous African countries seeking to 
translate political independence from colonial powers into economic benefits for their African 
population. For instance, Zambia’s first President, Kenneth Kaunda, bemoaned the lack of 
businesses owned or managed by Zambians in the years following independence in 1965 
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(Kaunda, 1968, quoted in Beveridge, 1974). A common response by newly independent 
African states - including Zambia, for instance - has been nationalization, often precipitating a 
deleterious nationalization-privatization cycle (Chua, 1995). The alternative strategy has been 
to foster “indigenization,” which involves state policies requiring that companies involve locals 
as owners, managers, and suppliers. The tension between nationalization and indigenization 
has been prevalent in many African countries after independence (Wilson, 1990), especially in 
resource industries such as Nigeria’s oil sector (Ukiwo, 2008). Also in South Africa, critics of 
the government have complained that BEE is primarily about “elite enrichment” with little 
benefit for the poor (Ponte et al., 2007; Freund, 2007), and some have argued for nationalization 
of mines and banks as the preferred alternative (see Bond, 2013). 
Given that BEE is premised on state regulation, why or how might it be interpreted as 
a form of CSR, as has been the case in a number of contributions to the CSR literature (Arya 
& Bassi, 2009; Alessandri et al., 2011; Juggernath, Rampersad & Reddy, 2011)? Most of these 
contributions explicitly or implicitly argue for a link on the basis of a thematic overlap. For 
instance, Arya and Bassi (2009: 677-678) explain as follows: 
The Codes of Good Practice take a broad approach to CSR as they focus on increasing the incidence of 
principled behavior by South African organizations by altering organizational practices toward 
employees and by increasing corporations’ overall impact on society - yet they do not cover all areas of 
CSR. Instead, they focus on one area of CSR, namely, social issues directed at direct and indirect 
empowerment of historically disadvantaged people and building a diverse workforce. 
Focusing on this thematic overlap between BEE and CSR means that those thematic 
aspects of BEE that are outside the global CSR discourse – specifically the transfer of 
ownership to black South Africans – are conveniently ignored. At least it may be argued that 
these aspects are not irreconcilable, given that international human rights law allows such 
‘‘positive discrimination’’ as a special measure as long as it is not implemented indefinitely 
(Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR), 2008; though note there are no provisions in BEE 
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policies specifying their end just yet). In addition, the ownership transfer elements of the BEE 
scorecard have been somewhat diluted for MNEs. This is because sharing control and equity 
with local blacks has been the most contentious issue for MNEs.4  
Aside from the thematic alignment between BEE and CSR, however, an additional 
concern regarding these concepts’ commensurability may be related to BEE’s regulatory 
provenance. This would be premised on the assumption that CSR is primarily or even only 
about voluntary business actions that go beyond what is required by state regulation. Such a 
perspective is represented in the scholarly literature (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001) and has been 
identified as prominent especially in the United States context (Matten & Moon, 2008). While 
early, draft European policies on CSR also emphasised its voluntary aspects (European 
Commission, 2001), more recent policies identify a close interrelationship between CSR and 
government regulation (European Commission, 2011; see also Vogel, 2010). The assumption 
of CSR as a voluntary business pursuit has thus diminished and CSR is a prominent theme in 
diverse public policies (Fox, 2004; Campbell, 2007; Matten & Moon, 2008; McBarnet, 
Voiculescu & Campbell, 2007; Moon & Vogel, 2008; Arya & Bassi, 2009; Steurer, 2010; 
Knudsen, Moon & Slager, 2014). This broadened conception of CSR is thus able to include 
state-driven policy frameworks, such as BEE in South Africa. A prominent role for the state in 
delineating CSR has also received dedicated attention among scholars focused on South Africa 
and other African countries (Hamann et al., 2005; Muthuri & Gilbert, 2011; Mzembe & 
Meaton, 2013). 
A second aspect worth noting is that despite its regulatory provenance, business 
responses to BEE are characterised by significant diversity in terms of motives and 
commitment. In terms of implementation, some of this variance is related to the BEE codes 
themselves, which allow for varying degrees of performance. There is thus some strategic 
discretion provided for companies with regard to the level of their BEE commitment. In terms 
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of motivation, some companies have interpreted BEE as an onerous regulatory burden, a tax, 
or even an infringement of bilateral trade agreements.5 Others have highlighted its normative 
appropriateness (Chabane, Roberts & Goldstein, 2006) or the longer-term business benefits, 
including access to a broader skills base and mitigating the risk of populist government policies, 
such as nationalization.6 In sum, these various factors – thematic overlaps between BEE and 
CSR; a broadening of CSR conceptions to include state regulation; and variations in strategic 
commitment and motivation to respond to BEE requirements – combine to make BEE a 
prominent local variant of the global CSR movement. They also highlight the pertinence of 
considering why some MNEs may give more attention to BEE than others. 
Measures	and	data	collection	
Our unit of analysis is the foreign-based MNE operating in South Africa. We collected 
data on MNEs’ BEE scores and CSR performance focusing on environmental and on human 
rights criteria. All in all, we assessed the BEE and CSR performance of 93 publicly listed 
companies with significant operations in South Africa.7 These companies were identified by 
choosing the largest investors in operations in South Africa from each of the three most 
prominent areas of origin: Europe (36 companies), Asia (27 companies), and North America 
(30 companies). The data were collected during 2010 from these companies’ public reports, 
including company websites, annual reports, and sustainability reports for the year 2009. The 
content analysis of these texts gave rise to quantitative data representing our independent and 
dependent variables.  
Global	 CSR. This is our key independent variable measuring MNEs’ global CSR 
commitment. We opted to measure MNEs’ CSR commitment through a content analysis of 
their public reports so as to ensure a coherent approach that covers a broad array of CSR 
themes. An alternative might have been to consider third-party assessments by stock exchanges 
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or analysts. But we worried that available assessments of this sort do not include MNEs from 
different regions and / or do not cover a broad array of CSR themes. 
We measured the Global CSR variable by means of thirteen items focused on the extent 
to which human rights and environmental issues were addressed in firms’ policies, practices, 
and management structures, and the extent to which such efforts were motivated explicitly with 
reference to competitiveness, ethics, or compliance. These items are listed in Table 1. Each 
item was given a score between 0 and 3 depending on how systematically and rigorously it was 
addressed by the firm, as described in the public reports. We adapted our coding schematic 
from Hamann, Sinha, Kapfudzaruwa and Schild (2009); and a similar four-point scale was 
applied in an analysis of corporate reports by Dawkins and Ngunjiri (2008). Based on 
methodological recommendations for content analysis (Krippendorff, 1980), the coding 
process was guided by a scoring schematic, as provided in Table 2. We checked for item 
correlations against the rest of items in the scale and removed those items with correlations less 
than 0.5. Our standardised scale resulted in a Cronbach alpha value of 0.90. 
Local	CSR	(BEE). This is our dependent variable. MNEs’ local CSR efforts, through 
BEE, were also assessed by examining public reports using the content analysis scoring 
schematic provided in Table 2. The specific items are listed in Table 3 and generally focus on 
the extent to which BEE-specific themes are addressed in firms’ policies, practices, and 
management structures, and the extent to which they are motivated explicitly. One of the items 
focuses on the company’s formal BEE score, which is generally calculated and assured by third 
party verification agencies, based on criteria established in the government’s “Codes of Good 
Practice” (see also Arya & Bassi, 2009). It could be argued that we should rely entirely on this 
externally assured measure, but we assessed this as part of the content analysis schematic and 
together with other items for two reasons. First, not all 93 MNEs reported their formal BEE 
scores and efforts to obtain these data from the South African government were unsuccessful. 
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We thus gave companies that did not report their formal BEE score a 0 for this item and 
companies that did report the formal BEE score were coded in correspondence with this score. 
Second, our research question is focused on the degree to which firms respond to local CSR 
expectations as being congruent with their broader CSR approach, so we wanted to measure 
not just firms’ BEE performance per se, but also the extent to which they publicly reported on 
this as part of their CSR-related communication to stakeholders. The Cronbach alpha value for 
our resulting scale of seven items is 0.85. 
A number of additional means were implemented to enhance the reliability of the 
coding process. For a start, the definition of hypotheses and the coding process were undertaken 
by different members of the research team. The coding was thus done without any knowledge 
of the hypotheses. In addition, an inter-coder reliability test was conducted. Ten companies 
(representing 10% of the original sample of 100 companies) were coded by two researchers 
simultaneously. We calculated the Krippendorff alpha (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007) to 
measure the degree of agreement between these coding sets, with alpha scores between 0.67 
and 0.80 representing sufficient reliability (Krippendorff,  1980). The average alpha score for 
our sub-set of companies was 0.71, with none of the companies in our sub-set having a score 
of below 0.60. We are thus reasonably confident in the reliability of the data for our Global 
CSR and Local CSR variables. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------ 





Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
We are cognisant of the limitations associated with a cross-sectional design based on 
data that were largely collected from companies’ public reports. It may thus be argued that we 
are measuring CSR and BEE disclosure, not performance itself. However, many of the 
indicators, though based on public disclosure, intentionally include aspects of performance 
beyond the existence of policies and programmes (this is an explicit intention of the Human 
Rights Compliance Assessment, on which our CSR and some of the BEE indicators are based 
– see Danish Institute for Human Rights (2008) and Hamann et al (2009)). Furthermore, our 
focused research question is specifically about the degree to which local, state-driven variants 
of CSR are seen by MNE subsidiaries as connected to global CSR and communicated as such. 
That is, disclosure is an important aspect of what we are measuring in both the independent 
and dependent variables. Nevertheless we recognise this as a constraint in our methodology 
(on the role of reporting and its links to performance and accountability, see Dawkins and 
Ngunjiri (2008) and Kolk (2008)).  
We also recognize possible risks associated with the fact that both our dependent and 
independent variables arise, in the main, from the same secondary data source; that is, common 
methods bias. We mitigate possible problems associated with a common rater (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003) by means of the efforts to enhance coding reliability 
mentioned above. We also ensured that our measures included at least five items. Finally, our 
interaction model is complex and thus difficult to visualize, which further reduces common 
method bias (Chang, Van Witteloostuijn & Eden, 2010). 	
Regulatory	distance.	To measure regulatory distance between host and home countries, 
we used data from the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report for 2006-2007 
(World Economic Forum, 2006). The report measures a range of economic, infrastructural and 
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political variables in 148 nations, grouped into nine pillars that are considered “critical to 
driving productivity and competitiveness” (op cit.: 5). One of these pillars is “institutions,” and 
one of the measures most directly related to governments’ efforts to regulate economic activity 
focuses on respondents’ perception of regulatory burden. We focus on this particular measure 
because regulatory requirements specifying social obligations are often perceived as burdens 
by managers (Porter, Schwab, Sala-i-Martin, & Lopez-Claros, 2004). Specifically, the question 
posed to business leaders was, “In your country, how burdensome is it for businesses to comply 
with governmental administrative requirements (e.g., permits, regulations, reporting)?” 
Responses were on a scale from 1 to 7. The average number of respondents per country was 
90 (World Economic Forum, 2006: 59).8 
In order to estimate the “distance” we use the Kogut and Singh (1988) formula below:  
	D ൌ 	∑ ୍౟,౞౥౩౪ି୍౟,౥౨౟ౝ౟౤ሻమ୬୚౟ 	
where Ii,host (Ii,origin) is the ith dimension of the index for the host country (country of origin) and 
Vi is the variance of the ith dimension and n is the number of dimensions used. In our case n 
was equal to one.	
Control	 variables. In order to control for competing explanations, we included a 
number of other variables considered significant. Because our dependent variable is BEE 
performance, we control for factors that could systematically affect BEE performance. 
Responses to institutional idiosyncrasies may be affected by organizational attributes such as 
size, age or industry segment (Henisz, 2003). Accordingly, we control for market capitalisation 
of the MNE, the number of years that the MNE has been operating in SA, and the economic 
sector of the MNE. Market capitalisation was used as a proxy for size, which has been shown 
to influence an enterprise’s CSR performance particularly for North American MNEs 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Sotorrío & Sánchez, 2008). We also expect that a MNE that has 
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been operating in SA for a long period will have had more opportunities to respond to the local 
institutional context and its stakeholders.  
We expect MNEs in those sectors that are dependent on government licences and 
procurement to experience greater pressure to implement BEE. MNEs within the mining and 
oil and gas sectors rely on the state to grant them licences to operate. Other MNEs in service 
type sectors, e.g. consulting, finance, and information technology hardware and software, rely 
on the state procurement for a significant amount of their revenue. Public hospitals and clinics 
also procure a significant amount of pharmaceuticals. We use a dummy variable labelled 
“procurement and licence pressure” where 1 represents those sectors relying on state licences 
and/or procurement and 0 represents those that do not. 
Analysis	
We use multiple regression to test the significance of Global CSR, regulatory distance 
and respective interaction terms. This interaction term was necessary to model the contingency 
effect of regulatory distance on the global CSR-local CSR relationship. We tested for an 
interaction effect by observing the significance of the interaction term. Bearing in mind our 
hypothesis on the nature of the interaction, the significance of the interaction term signalled 
the importance of examining the particular interaction further. We plotted the slopes (Dawson 
& Richter, 2006) to examine the nature of the interaction.  
In order to simplify the model we removed those control variables that turned out to be 
not significant. These were size (market capitalisation) and the time spent by the MNEs in 
South Africa. We suggest that while size may influence CSR performance (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2001; Sotorrío & Sánchez, 2008), and while duration of local presence may influence 
local responsiveness, per se, these variables need not markedly influence our hypothesized 
interaction between CSR commitment and regulatory distance. Once these control variables 
were removed, the model’s interaction term remained statistically significant and did not 
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change sign from the original model with all control variables. We therefore removed these 
variables from our correlation matrix in Table 4 and the final models shown in Table 6. We 
attribute the relatively large difference between adjusted r-square and r-square to our small 
sample size of 93 MNEs. 
	
Results	
The means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables are displayed in Table 
4. Though there are no high correlations between independent variables, we mean centred the 
variables before creating the interaction terms to ensure that multicollinearity was not an issue 
(Aiken & West, 1991).9 Resultant variation inflation factors were less than 5. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Table 5 characterises the cases across the four possible idealized combinations of our 
independent variable (global CSR commitment) and the moderating variable (regulatory 
distance). It shows that each of these four types was represented relatively equally in our 
sample, which is helpful for our statistical analysis. While there is no clear differentiation of 
industries, home countries with relatively low regulatory distance were China, France, 
Germany, India, and the United Kingdom, while the home countries with relatively higher 
regulatory distance included in particular Japan and the United States of America. (This is 
broadly in line with analyses of national business systems (Witt & Redding, 2013) – see also 
endnote 8.) 
Table 6 presents the results of the regression analysis. Model 1 includes all variables 
without the interaction term. Note that the relationship between global CSR and local CSR is 
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significant only at the ten percent level, supporting our argument that there is no universal 
effect of global CSR on local CSR. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------- 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Our hypothesis suggests that the moderating effect of regulatory distance would be 
significant. Our results displayed in model 2 (B= -.140, P <1%) support this. The negative sign 
of the interaction term supports our hypothesis with regard to the directionality of the 
moderating effect of regulatory distance on the global CSR-local CSR relationship. We also 
use a graph to confirm this, as depicted in Figure 2. It shows that increases in global CSR 
commitment have a positive effect on local CSR responsiveness when regulatory distance is 
low. In contrast, increases in global CSR commitment have a negative effect on local CSR 
responsiveness when regulatory distance is high.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Discussion	
Our study set out to understand how MNEs respond to local, state-driven versions of 
CSR common in many African countries. Such “indigenization” or “black empowerment” 
policies have been and still are common in Africa, as governments seek to translate political 
independence from colonial or apartheid powers into economic benefits for the local African 
population. They commonly require domestic and multinational companies to give preference 
23 
 
to designated groups in the company’s ownership, employment and procurement, and also to 
contribute to broader social development initiatives. In our empirical analysis, we focused in 
particular on South Africa’s BEE policy, which we described as a prominent local variant of 
the global CSR movement despite its thematic idiosyncrasies and regulatory provenance. 
While we see BEE as an example of African governments’ attempts to define legitimate 
corporate behavior in a post-colonial context, there are differences in kind and in degree 
between these attempts, so pan-African generalisations will need to be made with caution. 
The extant literature on global-local CSR could not provide clear predictions for how 
MNEs would respond to state-driven, local CSR variants such as BEE. Some suggest that high 
global CSR commitment provides firms with the motivation and ability to respond to local 
CSR variants (Kolk et al, 2010; Cruz & Boehe, 2010), while others argue that it leads to 
managers prioritising internal legitimacy at the expense of local responsiveness (Muller, 2006; 
Kostova et al. 2008; Tan & Wang, 2011; Bondy & Starkey, 2014; Barkemeyer & Figge, 2014). 
We noted that these uncertainties about the relationship between global CSR commitment and 
local responsiveness are reflected in doubts and queries voiced by practitioners in both public 
and private sectors (see also Chahoud et al., 2011). 
We responded to these uncertainties in theory and practice by proposing that the 
relationship between global CSR commitment and local responsiveness is moderated by 
regulatory distance. We focused on regulatory distance instead of a broader, aggregate 
construct of institutional distance because of our interest in African, state-driven CSR variants 
and in order to develop a more specific argument. We then predicted the outcomes of this 
interaction using an institutional logics perspective. Specifically, we argued that for MNEs 
from a home country, in which the state is expected to play a more interventionist role in 
defining CSR, an increase in global CSR commitment will lead to a greater responsiveness to 
local, state-driven CSR such as BEE. For such firms, the local, state-driven variant is seen as 
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compatible with their global CSR commitment. On the other hand, in the case of MNEs from 
a home country, in which CSR is seen in voluntaristic terms and where the state is not expected 
to be involved in defining or even regulating CSR, an increase in global CSR commitment will 
lead to a widening gap between the firm’s conception of CSR and local, state-driven CSR. This 
gap leads to resistance to connecting state-driven variants of CSR such as BEE to the firm’s 
global CSR efforts. Our analysis of data collected from 93 MNEs from diverse home regions 
operating in South Africa supported these hypotheses. 
Contributions and implications 
Our primary contribution is to the literature on global-local CSR (Barkemeyer & Figge, 
2014; Bondy & Starkey, 2014; Campbell et al, 2012; Cruz & Boehe, 2010; Gardberg & 
Fombrun, 2006; Kolk et al, 2010; Muller, 2006; Kostova et al. 2008; Salomon & Wu, 2012; 
Tan & Wang, 2011; Yang & Rivers, 2009). We build on Campbell and colleagues’ (2012) 
argument on the important role of administrative distance, first, by contextualising and 
focusing the analysis on state-driven local CSR variants (implied in their study) and on 
regulatory distance as a more specific dimension of institutional distance. We extend their 
analysis by using regulatory distance not as an independent variable, but as a moderator of the 
role of firms’ global CSR commitment.  
Furthermore we theorise the impact of this interaction using an institutional logics 
perspective. We use this theoretical lens to argue that the MNE-internal institutional 
environment (the importance of which has been emphasised by Kostova et al. [2008] and 
Kostova & Zaheer [1999]), “carries” the state logic so as to influence MNEs’ responsiveness 
to local, state-driven CSR variants. Our second contribution is thus to illustrate the potential of 




Our model allows us to make the counter-intuitive argument that MNEs with greater 
global CSR commitment will be more or less responsive to local, state-driven CSR variants 
depending on their origin. This aids our nascent understanding of CSR in the African context, 
where many governments have policies focused on enhancing Africans’ ownership of and 
inclusion in economic activity. This is likely to be an enduring characteristic of CSR in Africa, 
also considering calls for state regulation to improve CSR uptake in Africa (Muthuri & Gilbert, 
2011; Mzembe & Meaton, 2013).  
So, even while the “explicit” CSR approach that emerged in the United States, which 
generally expects only a minor role for the state in defining business responsibilities, is 
becoming increasingly globalised (Matten & Moon, 2008), CSR in Africa will develop with a 
strong role for the state in defining at least some dimensions of CSR. This prominent role for 
the state is juxtaposed paradoxically to the relative weakness of many African states, which 
creates rather different motivations for CSR as a way to fill gaps in the provision of public 
goods (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Börzel & Hamann, 2013). The African context thus gives rise 
to diverse motives for CSR, which in turn will give rise to novel hybrids between “explicit” 
and “implicit” CSR (Matten & Moon, 2008). Our third contribution is thus to extend Matten 
and Moon’s (2008) framework to the context of MNEs straddling different institutional 
business systems. This allows us to show that CSR in Africa will not only be shaped by the 
complexities of the local institutional context, but also MNEs’ home country institutions. 
We have argued that MNEs’ responses to local, state-driven variants of CSR will not 
be uniform, as might have been expected from neo-institutional theory, or as is commonly 
assumed by policy-makers. Nor will such responses be easily predicted with regard to the 
MNEs’ global CSR commitment. This has implications for policy makers, who will need to 
recognise that MNEs’ narratives about CSR are not uniform. In particular, while some 
companies’ global CSR commitments may give rise to a proactive approach to local, 
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regulation-driven versions of CSR, similar commitments from other MNEs will in fact have 
the opposite effect. A policy implication of this might be that quasi-discretionary aspects of 
policies like South Africa’s BEE policy might need to be backed up with clearer and more 
explicit compliance-driven expectations. For managers in MNEs, our analysis suggests that 
their firm-internal expectations of the role of the state might predispose them to resistance to 
local, state-driven approaches to CSR, thus preventing the kind of response hoped for by the 
local state and possibly leading to acrimony in the political process of negotiating legitimacy 
(Kostova et al., 2008). 
Limitations and further research 
Our study has the following limitations. First, our model focuses on the global-local 
CSR relationship in those instances, when the local variant is state-driven. We motivated this 
focus with reference to our particular interest in the African context, where state-driven local 
CSR variants are prominent. This means, however, that our model will not necessarily apply 
in instances where the defining differences between host and home country institutions are not 
regulatory in nature. Further research may want to consider other disaggregated aspects of 
institutional differences (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Xu & Shenkar, 2002), such as cognitive 
structures or cultural norms, and how they influence the relationship between firms’ global 
commitments and local responsiveness. Furthermore, we do not empirically address the 
substantive differences between ostensibly global standards for CSR, such as the United 
Nations Global Compact, and what Tan and Wang (2011) call idiosyncratic ethical pressures 
prominent in local institutional contexts. Focusing on the role of local CSR variants’ 
substantive content, over and above their regulatory provenance, is an additional avenue for 
further research. 
A second limitation relates to our methods and data. Our sample is limited to 93 
observations. As a result we chose a simple model with only a single control focusing on 
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“procurement and / or licence pressure” faced by MNEs to implement BEE. We were able to 
remove the controls for size (market capitalisation) and the time spent by the MNEs in South 
Africa from the final model, because the interaction term – on which we rely for empirical 
support of our argument – remained statistically significant and did not change sign in this 
process. We also reiterate possible limitations related to our reliance on companies’ public 
reports for many of our measures, as well as the imperfect proxy relied upon for regulatory 
distance. However, we have sought to mitigate the limitations of our sample and of our data 
sources by making the model as simple as possible and through a range of other efforts, as 
outlined in our methods section. We also highlight the exploratory nature of our study as part 
of a nascent literature on CSR in Africa. Subsequent research will need to develop these ideas 
in other contexts and with larger, more diverse, and more nuanced datasets. 
Finally, attentive readers may have noticed the striking fact that the lines in Figure 2 
cross. That is, our findings show not only that an increase in global CSR commitment gives 
rise to increasing or decreasing local CSR commitment, depending on regulatory distance. 
They also suggest that among those companies that have a low global CSR commitment, those 
with high regulatory distance are more locally responsive than those with low regulatory 
distance. This was a significant surprise for us that could not be explained by our theoretical 
reasoning (though it may well have to do with the “distance paradox” identified by O’Grady 
and Lane (1996)). We also do not feel confident in using our data and analysis to explicate this 
post hoc. This surprising finding will thus need some further attention. 
 
Conclusion	
The question of how MNEs respond to local variants of CSR is of scholarly and 
practical interest. In many African countries, CSR is partly defined by governments’ attempts 
to regulate and incentivise companies’ behaviour to enhance indigenous Africans’ access to 
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economic opportunities. We argued that despite some areas of thematic divergence and the 
regulatory provenance of such policies, like BEE in South Africa, their link to global CSR is 
nevertheless relevant due to thematic overlap, a broadening of CSR conceptions, and some 
degree of discretion in firms’ responses. It is this juxtaposition of distinctiveness and 
similarities that makes state-driven CSR like BEE such an interesting local variant of the global 
CSR movement. Yet some MNEs laying claim to global leadership in CSR and sustainable 
development are nevertheless resistant to BEE. This has been puzzling to local policy makers, 
but is explained in our analysis. We show that MNEs’ local responsiveness is influenced by 
the regulatory distance between home and host countries, and specifically the degree to which 
a MNE’s firm-internal conception of CSR allows for a prominent role for the state in defining 
CSR. For MNEs from home countries with a weak state logic, an increase in global CSR 
commitment leads to diminished willingness to engage in local, state-driven business 
responsibilities as part of the firm’s global CSR. CSR in Africa is thus shaped not only by 
complex local contexts, but also MNEs’ home environments and their effect on firm-internal 
environments.   
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Figure 1: Conceptual model showing moderating role for regulatory distance in the global-
local CSR relationship 
 
 
Table 1: Global CSR items 
 
Specific indicators 
How significant are human rights overall in the public reports in terms of total space given? 
How significant are environment / climate change overall in the public reports in terms of total 
space given? 
Is there a dedicated corporate social investment / strategic philanthropy programme and budget? 
How important are human rights in terms of strategy for the firm in the leadership statement / 
commitment? 
How important are environment / climate change in terms of strategy for the firm in the leadership 
statement / commitment? 
Are human rights explicitly motivated in terms of compliance? 
Are human rights explicitly motivated in terms of competitiveness? 
Are human rights explicitly motivated in terms of ethics? 
Are environment / climate change explicitly motivated in terms of compliance? 
Are environment / climate change explicitly motivated in terms of competitiveness? 
Are environment / climate change explicitly motivated in terms of ethics? 
Is there a dedicated management, reporting and board structure for human rights? 







Table 2: Coding system in the content analysis of public information 
 
Score Criteria 
0 No information about the indicator is provided 
1 Basic information relevant to the indicator is provided, but there is no link to company strategy or operations 
2 Information is provided with regard to the indicator, including basic information about strategic intent and operational aspects 





Table 3: Local CSR (BEE) items 
 
Specific indicators 
What is the aggregate BEE score as per the “Codes of Good Practice”? 
How significant is BEE overall in the public report in terms of total space given? 
How important is BEE in terms of strategy for the firm in the leadership statement / commitment? 
Is BEE explicitly motivated in terms of compliance? 
Is BEE explicitly motivated in terms of competitiveness? 
Is BEE explicitly motivated in terms of ethics? 









Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
 
Mean sd. 1 2 3 
1. Local CSR (BEE) .284 .463     
2. Global CSR 1.191 .526 .171#   
3. Regulatory distance 2.349 3.256 -.098 .002  








Table 5: An overview of cases in our sample in terms of combinations of independent 










High Low 23 Mostly firms from Germany, France and the UK, 
from sectors including automobiles, chemicals, 
finance, mining, and oil & gas 
High High 25 Mostly firms from Japan and the US, from sectors 
including automobiles, consumer goods, IT 
hardware, and industrials 
Low Low 21 Mostly firms from China, Germany, India, and the 
UK, from sectors including finance, pharmaceuticals, 
and mining 
Low High 24 Mostly firms from Japan and the US, from sectors 
including automobiles, consumer goods, IT 




Table 6: Regression results 
 
Dependent variable: Local CSR responsiveness (BEE 
implementation) 
Model 1  Model 2  
  β  β  
Constant .220*** .198*** 
Procurement and licence pressure .151# .204* 
Global CSR .156# .091 
Regulatory distance -.013 -.018 
Global CSR x Regulatory distance  -.140** 
   
Sample number 93 93 
F 2.06 3.73 
Prob. > F .112 .008 
R-square .065 0.145 
Adjusted R-square .033 .106 












1 Note that the official acronym for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment in South 
Africa is BBBEE, but we shorten this to BEE for convenience. 
2 The World Bank calculates South Africa’s Gini coefficient at 0.63 in 2009, higher than all 
other countries in its list (World Bank, 2009), while Leibbrandt et al. (2012) arrive at an even 
higher measure of 0.70 for 2008, an increase from 0.66 in 1993. 
3 Then Deputy President Mbeki argued as follows: “One of these nations is white, relatively 
prosperous, regardless of gender or geographical dispersal. It has ready access to a developed 
economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. The second and 
larger nation of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst-affected being women in the 
rural areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled. This nation lives under 
conditions of grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication, and 
other infrastructure” (Mbeki, 1998). While Mbeki highlighted the lack of interaction between 
these “nations” and called for government intervention to bring about greater integration of 
black South Africans in the formal economy, du Toit, Skuse, and Cousins, (2007) argue that 
the poor are already “adversely incorporated” in the formal economy. 
4 Some MNEs – notably in the ICT sector – have argued that their corporate structures cannot 
allow them to set up subsidiaries that can fulfil the direct empowerment criteria. This has 
contributed to an ongoing policy discussion that culminated in the government providing for 
the recognition of equity equivalents for multinationals, which allows MNEs to offset direct 
empowerment criteria by means of support to social projects (Republic of South Africa, 2007). 
5 A prominent example of this was the Piero Foresti case, in which European investors 
challenged South African BEE policies – specifically the regulations based on the Minerals 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act 2002 – on the basis that they violated expropriation 
provisions in bilateral investment treaties between South Africa and Italy and between South 
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Africa and Benelux countries. The case received significant attention in the international 
media, which ostensibly contributed to the claim being discontinued (Jacob, 2010). 
6 For instance, the former CEO of Anglo Gold (South Africa’s largest gold producer, now 
called AngloGold Ashanti) argued in support of BEE in terms very similar to the broader CSR 
“business case” discourse: “What the [BEE] Charter is turning out to be is a test of the social 
licence. A business will only survive if it benefits all of its stakeholders over time – if people, 
the community, customers, employees and shareholders are left better off having an association 
with the company… To draw on the gene pool of 100% of South Africa, not just white males, 
has got to be a good thing” (quoted in Hamann et al., 2008: 24). 
7 The list of 93 companies is available on request. MNE home countries include the USA, 
Canada, Finland, Switzerland, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, Japan, South 
Korea, India, and China.  
8 In a previous version of this paper, we attempted to use categorical data on certain regions’ 
national business systems (NBSs) (Witt & Redding, 2013), but we subsequently opted for the 
approach described here because of the qualitative character of “much of the NBS literature” 
(Matten & Moon, 2008: 410).  
9 Of course this was not the case for variables using dummy measures viz. sectors. 
